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The 2007-09 global financial crisis has led to a rethinking of the role of financial intermediaries 
for economic fluctuations. Before the financial crisis, the workhorse macro models used by 
policy institutions and by academic researchers abstracted from banks (e.g., Christiano et al. 
(2005)). The crisis has stimulated much research that incorporates banks into quantitative 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given the global nature of the banking 
industry, and of the financial crisis, that research has frequently focused on open economy 
models; see, e.g., Devereux and Sutherland (2011), Kollmann et al. (2011, 2013), Perri and 
Quadrini (2011), Ueda (2012), Dedola et al. (2013), Kamber and Thoenissen (2013) and 
Kollmann (2013). In this new class of DSGE models, bank capital is a key state variable for real 
activity; negative shocks to bank capital are predicted to increase the spread between banks’ 
lending and deposit rates, and to trigger a fall in bank credit, investment and output; with a 
globalized banking system, losses on bank assets in one country can thus lead to a worldwide 
recession.   
 The paper by Victoria Nuguer makes a very interesting contribution to the new literature 
on open economy DSGE models with banks. Her paper highlights the role of country 
asymmetries for the transmission of banking shocks, and for the optimal policy response to those 
shocks. While most related studies assume symmetric countries, Victoria considers a world with 
two countries of vastly different size. The small country has a comparative advantage in banking, 
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and its banks are thus larger than banks in the big country. The model is calibrated to data for 
Switzerland and the US.  
 The non-financial aspects of the model follow the International Real Business Cycle 
literature (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994)). Each country is specialized in the production of 
a tradable intermediate good. All markets are competitive; prices and wages are flexible. The 
modeling of banks in Victoria’s paper is inspired by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Dedola et 
al. (2013). Each country is inhabited by a representative family; a constant fraction of the family 
members are production workers; the remaining members are bankers (there are random 
switches between these occupations). Workers cannot directly provide their savings to non-
financial firms (that borrow to finance physical investment); instead, savings have to be 
channeled to firms via banks. To prevent embezzlement of bank assets by bankers, a minimum 
fraction of bank assets has to be funded with bankers’ personal net worth (accumulated past 
profits). This capital requirement limits bank asset holdings. To ensure that the bank capital 
requirement is always binding, the model assumes that bankers have finite expected job spells, 
which restricts their net worth accumulation. Crucially, the model posits that bankers in the small 
country have longer expected job spells (than bankers in the big country); thus, the average 
small-country bank has more assets than a typical bank in the big country. Small-country banks 
hence hold a share of their assets abroad; the model assumes that foreign investment takes the 
form of loans to big-country banks (big-country banks only hold local assets). The interest rate 
on loans is assumed to equal the rate of return on physical capital in the borrowing country. The 
model postulates that the global interbank market is frictionless (there is no agency problem 
between banks).  
The analysis in the paper centers on the effects of exogenous stochastic ‘capital quality’ 
shocks in the big country. These shocks are non-positive, i.e. they may destroy a fraction of the 
big country’s physical capital stock (the shocks are introduced to capture the fall in US real 
estate prices that triggered the global financial crisis). The net worth of both big- and small-
country banks drops, in response to a negative capital quality shock in the big country. The 
model predicts that this induces a fall in bank lending, physical investment and output in both 
countries. As mentioned above, qualitatively similar cross-country transmission effects (via 
global banks) have been discussed in previous studies that assume symmetric countries. 
Nevertheless, Victoria’s analysis is interesting, as it shows that the transmission of foreign 
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financial shocks is especially powerful to a small foreign country with large banks. The same 
intuitive point was previously made by Kamber and Thoenissen (2013), albeit in a banking 
model with a different structure. Victoria provides a statistical analysis (vector autoregressions) 
using data for the US and Switzerland that supports the prediction of strong shock transmission 
from the US to Switzerland, during the global financial structure.   
A key property of the model, which is not discussed in the paper, is that the stochastic 
capital quality shocks in the big country raise the unconditional expected welfare of the small 
country, compared to welfare in the deterministic steady state of the world economy (without 
shocks). This surprising prediction is important for interpreting the welfare effects of 
stabilization policy (see below). (Big-country unconditional welfare is lower in the presence of 
the stochastic big-country capital quality shocks, but this is not astonishing as the shocks only 
takes zero or negative values; in the stochastic economy, the mean big-country capital stock is 
thus smaller than in the deterministic steady state.) Tables 2 and E.1 show that the higher small-
country unconditional welfare (under stochastic shocks) reflects an increase in mean small-
country net foreign asset holdings (compared to the deterministic steady state), which is 
accompanied by a rise in mean consumption and a fall in mean hours worked in the small 
country.
2
 More research on these effects would be useful. I conjecture that the higher average 
small-country net foreign asset position (under stochastic shocks) might reflect an increase in the 
average return on physical capital in the big country, which raises the average return on the small 
country’s foreign assets. Hence, the small-country unconditional welfare increase (induced by 
the foreign stochastic shocks) might hinge on two key assumptions: (1) the return on foreign 
loans made by small-country banks is indexed to the foreign physical capital return; (2) the small 
country is a net lender. Welfare spillovers would change if standard unconditional bank loans 
were assumed. If the small country were structurally a net debtor, then big-country stochastic 
shocks might make the small country worse off, due to a rise in the return on the country’s 
foreign liabilities. Note also that adverse big-country shocks worsen the small-country’s terms of 
trade. A stronger terms of trade deterioration (than under the baseline calibration), due to greater 
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complementarity between domestic and foreign tradables, too might imply a fall in small-country 
unconditional welfare.  
An important contribution of Victoria’s paper is the analysis of ‘unconventional’ central 
bank policies in response to adverse capital quality shocks in the big country. Three types of 
policy interventions (by both countries) are considered: bank equity injections, central bank 
lending to non-financial firms, and central bank lending to foreign banks. These types of policies 
have similar effects. Importantly, the model assumes that central banks do not face a collateral 
constraint (capital requirement), i.e. central banks have an advantage over commercial banks in 
making loans. As might be expected, central bank intervention (in response to shocks that impair 
commercial banks) stabilizes credit, investment and output, both in the domestic economy, and 
abroad. Stabilization policy by the big country’s central bank can markedly dampen the 
contraction of output in the small country (naturally, small-country central bank interventions 
have a much more muted stabilizing effect on the big country).  
Rules-based stabilization policy (governed by policy feedback rules under full 
commitment) by a given country raises domestic unconditional expected welfare, but lowers 
foreign unconditional welfare. The negative effect on foreign unconditional welfare might seem 
astonishing. However, this effect is in line with the fact that, in this model, random adverse 
capital quality shocks in the big country raise small country unconditional welfare (see above). 
Hence, it is not surprising that big-country policy interventions (that stabilize the domestic 
economy) reduce unconditional welfare in the small country. (However, it seems less clear why 
small-country stabilization policy lowers big-country unconditional welfare.) It would be very 
useful to investigate the robustness of that foreign unconditional welfare effect of stabilization 
policy--it might hinge on the assumption that the small country is a foreign creditor (see above).  
An immediate implication of the negative foreign unconditional welfare effect of 
stabilization policy is that the non-cooperative policy equilibrium (Nash) implies excessively 
aggressive response to financial shocks. Under Nash, unconditional welfare in both countries is 
lower than in the absence of any (domestic or foreign) policy response to financial shocks. In the 
model, coordinated stabilization policy that maximizes a (population-) weighted sum of the two 
countries’ unconditional welfare implies that only the central bank of the big country intervenes.  
This result is interesting, however it seems at odds with observed policies during the 
recent global financial crisis. During the crisis, international policy coordination was intense, but 
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big and small countries alike intervened aggressively to stabilize lending and bank equity. The 
welfare and policy results in this paper differ starkly from the ones obtained by Dedola et al. 
(2013) for a symmetric two-country model with banks. In that model, domestic stabilization 
policy raises foreign unconditional welfare, and thus there is too little intervention under Nash. A 
key insight of Victoria’s paper is thus that the international spillovers of stabilization policy, and 
the global policy equilibrium, are sensitive to country asymmetries.  
In my view, Victoria’s paper suggests many interesting avenues for future research. For 
example, her model assumes a frictionless global interbank market (as mentioned above). Yet, 
the interbank market was severely impaired during the global financial crisis (sharp rise in 
interbank spreads). It would be useful to extend the model by allowing for frictions in the 
interbank market. A second useful research avenue would be to consider bigger shocks. The 
model calibration assumes that an adverse -1.5% capital quality shocks in the big country occurs 
on average every 28 years. The unconditional welfare cost of the assumed shock process is 
small. An adverse shock triggers a fall in the price of physical capital that is very modest when 
compared, for example, to the 40% fall in US and European stock prices in 2008. The shocks 
assumed in the model do not threaten the solvency of the banking system. It would be very 
interesting to study the effect of bigger shocks that imperil the banking system. With bigger 
shocks, the welfare effects of unconventional policy might be much greater. However, analysis 
of big shocks would require the use to global numerical model solution methods, instead of the 
local numerical approximations employed in the paper. A third research avenue would be to 
assume price or wage stickiness. With nominal rigidities, the fall in aggregate demand induced 
by adverse banking shocks can have a much greater effect on output than in a flex price/wage 
world; accordingly, unconventional central bank policies too would boost aggregate output much 
more, in a world with nominal rigidities (see Kollmann et al. (2012, 2013) for New Keynesian 
models with banks, and bank rescue measures conducted by the government). Finally, it can be 
noted that the present model abstracts from conventional monetary and fiscal policy. During the 
global financial crisis, unconventional policies were combined with very large changes in 
conventional monetary and fiscal policy instruments. It would be fruitful to extend the model 
here by allowing for conventional macro policy tools; this would shed light on the optimal 
conventional/unconventional policy mix for coping with financial shocks.  
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In summary, Victoria Nuguer’s paper provides important insights into the role of country 
asymmetries for the transmission of financial shocks, and for optimal policy. Her paper also 
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